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Competition in the U.S. Energy Industry
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, AND PERFORMANCE
The study of
competition in an industry usually rests upon an analysis of market
structure, conduct, and performance. Structure refers to the
external environment within which the firm's decisions are made.
How a firm's policies, especially price policies, are determined is
the measure of market conduct, and market performance describes the
end results of market processes. Performance involves an assessment
of the extent to which the economic results of an industry's market
behavior deviate from the optimum contribution it could make to
achieving the accepted goals of society. Knowledge of the impact of
market structure and conduct on market performance provides a basis
for evaluating public policy designed to promote competition.
Antitrust laws, regulatory commissions, and legislation affecting
competition indirectly influence market performance by changing
either the structure of markets or the conduct of sellers in those
markets.
Public
Policy and Industrial Structure
Many modern
econometric studies of industrial organization have been concerned
with the various relationships between market structure and market
performance. This emphasis reflects the importance of public policy
questions in industrial organization. Government policies seldom
focus directly on performance, but rather are applied to structural
or behavioral features of markets. As a result, the
structure-performance relationship spurs considerable research that
attempts to serve the needs of policy makers.
The
structure-performance relationship remains obscure without a
generally accepted theory of oligopoly. Various models of
oligopolistic behavior exist, but they fall short of explaining
actual behavior. Researchers are forced to take a more inductive
approach, attempting to link certain structural variables with
aspects of market performance.
The greatest
amounts of research have been devoted to establishing the
relationship between levels of seller concentration in an industry
and allocative efficiency measured by long-run profitability.
Lesser amounts of research have been devoted to the relationship
between entry conditions and efficiency. It is possible to generate
oligopoly theories that lead to almost any prediction, but most
researchers have hypothesized that the probability of successful
collusion among sellers increases as the level of seller
concentration rises in an industry. As a result, high concentration
is predicted to be associated with high, long-run profit rates. In
an opposite manner, low concentration