The relationship between economic and political power has been the object of much speculation but there have been few attempts to systematically examine the relationship. In a paper commission by the EPP, Professors Salamon and Siegfried attempt to test certain hypotheses and to apply the results to the energy industry. Their results, while hardly conclusive, are a valuable contribution to our understanding of the interaction between the economic and political systems.

Salamon and Siegfried argue that the distribution of both incentives and relevant resources favor large, corporate interests over individual consumer-taxpayer interests in gaining access to and influencing policy-making. Political involvement can be viewed as an investment decision to be undertaken only when a satisfactory rate of return can be expected. The individual consumer has little incentive to make the investment necessary to influence government policy-making because the individual captures only a small amount of any benefits. Because of the "free rider" problem, most of the benefits flow to others. In the case of large scale corporate interests, the benefits to be gained by the corporation are much greater and, as a result, the incentives to undertake investment in political involvement are greater.

Corporate interests also have a distinct advantage over consumer interests in the distribution of the resources necessary to influence policy making; namely, money, expertise, and access to government officials. Consumers, on the other hand, generally have only the vote as a means to influence decisions.

The distribution of incentives and resources in favor of large scale