This book
is addressed to a limited aspect of energy policy, namely the state
of competition in domestic production of fossil and nuclear fuels.
The findings are applicable to the question of the effectiveness of
competition in these markets and the role of public policy in
ensuring an effective working of market processes.
It should
be emphasized at the outset that a lack of meaningful data has been
a major constraint. Deficiencies such as limited information
concerning the ownership pattern of fuel reserves, and the nearly
total lack of insight into the internal operations of major energy
companies, are serious obstacles to formulating long-run public
policies. This lack of information to policy-makers makes it only
too likely that past errors in policy selection will be repeated.
This is a risk and cost that society currently bears but, with
increased flows of information to policy makers, such risks could
be substantially reduced.
The general
conclusion of this book is that government imposed restrictions on
free markets are responsible for many of the energy problems facing
the U.S. Government intervention has ranged from the adoption of
administrative decision-making as a substitute for market processes
in determining price, as in the case of natural gas, to attempts to
influence the pattern of resource allocation by various subsidy
programs. Examples of the latter are market demand prorationing and
the use of import quotas in oil.
A major
effect of government intervention has been to change the incentives
or profit opportunities available to firms. In other words, firms
have faced a different set of incentives that would have existed
without government intervention. As an example, the use of foreign
tax credits had the effect of causing investment in new oil
capacity to be more attractive, i.e. profitable, in foreign markets
relative to the U.S. Oil company investments responded accordingly,
leaving the U.S. in the position of having a shortage of refining
capacity. This movement was advanced further by the fact that after
years of stimulating U.S. oil production through tax subsidies, the
remaining prospects in the U.S. were poor relative to foreign oil
prospects. Resource allocation problems exist in most of the energy
sources not because market mechanisms failed to operate but because
of government policies, both federal and state, imposed on the
market.
The higher
prices and shortages of energy in the U.S. are easily observed. In
such situations, a strong tendency exists among the public,
to