by a heavy investment program being carried on by Consol that had not yet begun to produce income. The data on the growth of large independent coal firms and the other large firms suggests that they grow equally fast, but most of the growth is accounted for by merger. In other words, the data on growth between 1962 and 1969 indicates that both groups were purchasing coal facilities at about the same rate. Given the tax advantages of purchasing coal mining property it is not surprising that these firms were expanding at a rapid rate.

The most convincing data is from the growth of Consol over the period 1968 to 1970 when the rest of the industry was declining. If this is considered typical of petroleum subsidiary behavior then there are obviously social gains from the integration of oil and coal. On the other hand, these figures are for only a short period and may be an aberration. At least they suggest caution in any policy designed to prevent petroleum companies from purchasing coal facilities or for any policy of divesting past acquisitions.

While the coal operations of major oil firms are small relative to their oil operations and unlikely to make much of an impact on their overall rate of return, it is interesting to note that two of the four major oil companies purchasing major coal enterprises in recent years—Continental Oil and Standard Oil of Ohio—earned less than the average of the top 20 oil firms (see Table B-6). One, Gulf Oil, earned about the average, while only Occidental Petroleum, which had purchased in 1968 the Island Creek Group with 6.8 percent of the coal industries production, made significantly more than the average. In fact, it was the industry leader for that year.