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Perspective on Power







appropriate to take such cost interdependencies into account in pricing on and off peak electricity. The former would be reduced and the latter increased relative to their respective marginal costs. Under such conditions the range in which the appropriate on peak price falls would be between the ceiling of the actual on peak costs and the costs on peak if there were no other services provided by the firm. It must be emphasized, however, that such deviations from strict marginal cost pricing are due to cost interdependencies and should not be implemented, as it is sometimes averred, for reasons of fairness or equity in the treatment of on and off peak uses.

Footnotes

Footnote :

e O. Williamson, "Peak Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity Under Indivisibility Constraints," American Economic Review, LXI, Sept. 1966, pp. 810-27.

Footnote :

f E. Bailey, "Peak-Load Pricing Under Regulatory Constraint," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80 (July/August), 1972, p. 675.

Footnote :

g E. Bailey and L.J. White, "Reversals in Peak and Off Peak Prices," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, forthcoming.

Footnote :

h S. Weintraub, Intermediate Price Theory, New York: Chilton Books, 1964, Chapter 15.

Footnote :

i For a further discussion of this point see Turvey's discussion of the difference between "ceteris paribus marginal cost" and "mutatis mutandis marginal cost" pricing for electric utilities, see page 78 in R. Turvey, Economic Analysis and Public Enterprises, Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971.

RELAXING THE DEMAND INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION

It is important to analyze the effect of relaxing the assumption of independence across demands for two reasons. First, the expectation of peak and off peak price differentials is that this will cause a substitution of the latter for the former. Second, in a positive (i.e., profit maximizing) decision maker's world the incentive to price discriminate in various markets would, a priori, appear to be different from a normative (i.e., welfare maximization) world.

In order to keep the mathematics simple it will be assumed that there are two markets, which may be distinguished based upon time of day or customer category differences. The quantity demanded in each depends upon its own price and the price in the other market. Costs are assumed to be independent. Therefore,

P1 = f(Q1, P2) (B.30)

P2 = g(Q2, P1)

If these alternative specifications of the willingness to pay or demand functions are substituted in the welfare functions used above, (12) or (22), the necessary conditions for welfare maximization can be derived by maximizing W**; note the equality between social and private costs continues to be presumed:


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