Chapter One Introduction

This book is about a narrow but important energy policy issue. We analyze the possibility of nuclear violence using fissionable material that might be stolen from the U.S. nuclear power industry, and we discuss what can and should be done to prevent that from happening.

Nuclear energy is rapidly becoming a major source of electric power in the United States and a growing number of other countries. Nuclear power requires the production, processing, and use as fuel of very large amounts of plutonium and high-enriched uranium. However, only a few kilograms of these fissionable materials are enough for a nuclear explosive capable of mass destruction, and tens of grams of plutonium are enough for a device capable of causing widespread radioactive contamination. Moreover, the design and manufacture of a crude nuclear explosive is no longer a difficult task technically, and a plutonium dispersal device is much simpler to make than an explosive.

Therefore, measures are necessary to ensure that the materials intended for use as nuclear fuel are not diverted for use in acts involving nuclear threats or violence. These measures, or safeguards, must be effective, because a successful nuclear theft could enable a small group to threaten the lives of many people, the social order within a nation, and the security of the international community of nations.

Experts in government and industry have known of the security risks inherent in nuclear power for many years. They have worked long and hard to develop safeguards against the dangers of nuclear theft. However, many governmental policymakers and industrial leaders in the energy field are only vaguely aware of the problem, and most of the general public does not know that it exists.

This study is intended, therefore, to contribute to public understanding of the technical facts and policy issues involved. We believe that these facts and issues affect substantially both the development of nuclear power and