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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards







Chapter Three Nuclear Fuel Cycles: 1973–1980

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 we considered the nuclear materials and other resources required to make fission bombs and described the damage that could result from nuclear explosions or the dispersal of plutonium. In order to appreciate the risk that nuclear weapon materials might be stolen from the nuclear power industry, our next step is to describe the facilities and operations that, taken together, comprise the "nuclear fuel cycles" required to support each major type of reactor used to generate electric power. A typical nuclear fuel cycle includes facilities for mining, converting, enriching, fabricating, using, reprocessing, and recycling nuclear fuels. It also includes all the transportation links between these facilities.

We want to know which points in each fuel cycle need safeguards against theft. Where can materials be found, both now and in the future, that are usable for making nuclear weapons? What quantities of these materials, in what physical and chemical forms, could thieves expect to find at different stages of a fuel cycle? How heavy and how large are the units that contain these materials likely to be? In short, we intend to provide in this chapter a factual basis for deciding which parts of nuclear fuel cycles are inherently most vulnerable to attempted thefts of nuclear weapon materials. We will then be prepared to consider various measures to safeguard against nuclear thefts in subsequent chapters.

We also briefly discuss in this chapter certain research applications of nuclear energy because they now involve considerable quantities of nuclear weapon materials, sometimes in forms that are especially susceptible to theft. We do not mean to imply, however, that these are the only civilian applications of nuclear energy where a risk of nuclear theft may exist. Other serious possibilities might arise beyond 1980. We restrict ourselves to the risks of theft primarily