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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards
this new type of LMFBR would produce more uranium–233 per
unit of consumed plutonium than the type of plutonium-fueled LWR
reactor we mentioned above. It would therefore decrease the demands
for uranium fuel for LWR types of plants and conserve uranium.
Still another
possibility for locally consuming all plutonium produced by
reprocessing plants, and for stopping all shipments of nuclear
weapon material to power plants, would be to use HTGR's that
consume plutonium instead of high-enriched uranium or
uranium–233 as fuel; this reactor could produce
uranium–233 for use in LWR reactors. It would produce
somewhat more uranium–233 per unit of consumed plutonium than
a plutonium-fueled LWR-type reactor.
Strictly
speaking, we can conceive only a few ways to abolish all shipments
of nuclear weapon material to HTGR power plants. One would be to
use HTGR reactors only in the system we have just described.
Another method would be to build very large power plants to make it
economical to locate at the same site as the reactors all parts of
the HTGR fuel cycle that involve nuclear weapon materials. A third
would be to use uranium of much lower enrichment in the coated fuel
particles in HTGR fuel assemblies. The last of these alternatives
would probably significantly increase the overall HTGR fuel cycle
costs, because it would require diluting the uranium–235 and
uranium–233 with four or five times as much
uranium–238, while still using relatively large amounts of
thorium. Whether this would be worth doing for reasons of nuclear
material security is debatable, since fabricated HTGR fuel in its
present or contemplated form is not a very effective source of
nuclear weapon material. Nuclear weapon materials are dilute in
HTGR fuel; they can only be separated from the diluting materials
by a complicated set of chemical and physical conversions.
OTHER
TYPES OF FISSION POWER PLANTS
The three
types of nuclear fission power reactors that formed the basis for
our alternative scenarios for nuclear power development through the
year 2000 are not the only ones that may be built in significant
numbers before the end of the century. At least a dozen or so
additional types of reactors have been intensively studied, and
significant research and development programs related to several of
these are currently underway in the United States. In this section
we shall briefly discuss two reactor concepts that, in our view,
offer some of the best possibilities for developing fuel cycles
that are relatively invulnerable to nuclear theft. We should
emphasize, however, that none of the other types of power reactors
are likely to be built for commercial production of power on a
large scale before the late 1980s at the earliest, even if
considerably greater development efforts than are now planned were
undertaken for any of them in the near future. We see no way to
forecast, at this time, which if any of these