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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards
In order to
comprehend where we stand today, it is important to have in mind
the main trends of development and the forces which have produced
those trends. Accordingly, in this chapter, we first trace the
development of the U.S. safeguards system in the recent past. (A
brief account of the general historical background from the end of
World War II to the present, emphasizing the international origins
and global dimensions of the basic safeguards issues, is included
in Appendix A.) Next, we analyze some of the important features of
current safeguards requirements. And finally, we consider the basic
character of the AEC's regulatory approach in this area thus
far.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: MID–1960s
TO PRESENT
Large
material flows in a far-flung nuclear power industry were an
inevitable consequence of the avalanche of commercial orders for
power reactors in the mid–1960s. Significant amounts of
plutonium and high-enriched uranium are already present in parts of
the various nuclear fuel cycles outside reactors. However, due to
the long lead-times involved in the construction of nuclear power
plants, and to delays in the commencement of plutonium recycle, the
large buildup will not actually begin until 1975–80.
Before the
nuclear power industry developed to a stage where large material
flows became inescapable, U.S. and foreign governments approached
the safeguards problem with the primary goal of forestalling the
spread of nuclear weapons in the international community. Their
first concern was to ensure that the development of nuclear power
throughout the world would not inevitably mean that more nations
would acquire a nuclear weapon capability. Because of the limits
inherent in an international political system based on independent
nation-states, it was generally recognized that "verification" was
the most that could be expected in the way of an assurance against
governmentally authorized diversion of material from civilian
industry for use in nuclear weapons. The only verification method
that might be widely accepted was materials accountancy, including
carefully limited international inspection. Continuous on-site
surveillance of nuclear activities by an international agency would
be unacceptable to most countries—at least in any intensive
form. Moreover, arming an international agency with the capability
to prevent governmentally authorized nuclear diversion would be
politically revolutionary.
Substantial
efforts from the mid–1960s onwards were devoted to developing
an international safeguards system within the constraints imposed
by