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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards







The nuclear research and development effort would be broadened to include all forms of energy, reorganized administratively, and labeled the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). The regulatory functions, on the other hand, would be conducted by a renamed Nuclear Energy Commission (NEC). The question of how best to organize the nuclear safeguards effort does not appear to have been addressed in developing these reorganization proposals.

Footnotes

Footnote :

b From the beginning of post-World War II arms control negotiations, the U.S. government's position has been that any international agreement to limit or reduce armaments must be subject to adequate "verification" of the fulfillment by the various parties of their respective obligations under the agreement. The method of verification the U.S. has been willing to rely on in existing arms control agreements depends on the nature of the obligations and the verification capabilities that can be appropriately brought to bear.

Footnote :

c The Atomic Energy Act and AEC regulations under the Act use the term "special nuclear material", which is defined to include uranium enriched in the isotope U–235, plutonium, and uranium–233. Since the term includes low-enriched uranium, "special nuclear material" has a broader meaning than either "fission explosive material," the term we use to denote materials that can be used directly as the core material in fission explosives, or "nuclear weapon materials," the more inclusive term we use to signify materials that can be used in fission explosives without complex chemical processing (like chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuels) or physical processes (like isotope enrichment using existing methods). Both fission explosive material and nuclear weapon material would include material that could be used in plutonium dispersal devices. Although we believe special nuclear material, as presently defined, is not a very helpful term, we use it in this chapter in our discussion of the existing U.S. safeguard requirements.

EXISTING REQUIREMENTS

Though safeguards are still under development, a description of existing U.S. requirements will help readers to understand the terminology and concepts involved, and to comprehend more concretely the difficulties that must be surmounted in developing and implementing an effective regulatory program of this nature. The analysis which follows exposes only the main elements and lines of difficulty. The description is based on the AEC regulations effective December, 1973, together with certain regulatory guides based on those regulations.

Readers should bear in mind from the outset, however, that in many areas the most important descriptions of safeguards will be contained in physical security plans to be prepared by individual licensees. The plans are to be withheld from the public record for reasons which are explained later, and we have had no access to any of these confidential documents during the course of research for our study.

Safeguards Authority

As indicated above, the statutory scheme for regulation of the nuclear power industry is based on licensing. Prior to issuing a license, the AEC is required by law to find that the proposed activity will not be "inimical to the common defense and security," and will not constitute "an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public." Of course, safeguards against nuclear theft are relevant to both findings. Significantly, AEC regulations authorize the Commission to incorporate in any license additional conditions and requirements that may be appropriate to guard against loss or diversion of special nuclear material. Hence, the AEC can, if it prefers, develop safeguards on a case-by-case basis, rather than by regulations imposed on the nuclear industry as a whole. Moreover, the AEC may require "backfitting," meaning modifications, of a facility that is being constructed or is already in operation if it finds that such action is required. Thus, if circumstances change, including the official assessment of the security risks involved, the AEC has the authority to require licensees to make substantial and costly changes in existing nuclear facilities.

The AEC has excluded from its licensing requirements common and contract carriers, freight forwarders, warehousemen, and the U.S. Postal Service when they transport or store special nuclear material "in the regular course of