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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards







the risks would seem to be greater in other countries than in the U.S., while others may be greater in the U.S. than elsewhere. Moreover, material stolen from the U.S. nuclear power industry might be used to threaten the security of people in foreign countries and their governments. Similarly, material diverted from the nuclear industry in a foreign country might form the basis for a nuclear threat within the U.S. (The related risks of governmental diversion in non-nuclear-weapon countries are considered in Appendix D).

Footnotes

Footnote :

a Throughout chapter 6 and the remainder of this book, we use "nuclear weapon material" to mean material that can be used in fission explosives or, in the case of plutonium, in dispersal devices either directly or with chemical conversions that are much simpler processes than those involved in reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuels or in isotope enrichment.

THEFT BY ONE PERSON ACTING ALONE

Reasons

The possible reasons for one person to attempt to steal nuclear weapon material from the nuclear power industry cover a broad spectrum. On one end of the motivation spectrum is financial gain, and on the other is a sick expression of extreme alienation from society as a whole. In between lie such motives as settling a grudge against the management of a nuclear plant, or a strong conviction that nuclear weapon proliferation is a good thing. Money would seem to be the most likely general motive for an individual to steal nuclear material, assuming a buyer were available. (The terrorist would normally be operating as part of a group rather than alone.)

More specifically, the lone person who contemplates theft of nuclear weapon material may do so with any of a large number of particular uses for the material in mind. Possible uses include the following:

Black Market Sale. The entire amount of stolen material might be sold in one transaction, if a large quantity of nuclear material would bring a premium price. Alternatively, small amounts might be sold over long periods of time in separate transactions, if the thief viewed his ill-gotten gains as something like a very precious metal to be liquidated in installments as income is needed.

Ransom of Stolen Material. If carefully worked out, the thief might be able to obtain at least as high a ransom for the stolen material as he would be able to get by sale in a black market. The nuclear enterprise stolen from would be one possible target of such a blackmail scheme; another might be the U.S. government. The nuclear enterprise, the government, and—depending on his tactics—the thief himself, might have a strong interest in keeping from the public any information about a nuclear theft. This possibility raises two questions: In what circumstances do the American people have a right or a need to know about a theft of material from the U.S. nuclear power industry? And, furthermore, do other governments have a right or a need to be informed about such a theft, if circumstances indicate that the stolen material has likely been taken out of the country?