Archives

Search Archives

Transforming Secondary Education: New $100 million initiative to improve education quality across the nation.
Learn More »

Recent Spotlights »

View all Archives - Environment and Development »

Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards







vulnerability to swift and forceful government action during the period between nuclear theft and completion of the fabrication of fission explosive devices or radiological weapons.

The ability of a government, whether U.S. or foreign, to deal with an emergent terrorist nuclear threat would depend on the location of the group's base of operations, particularly the location of its weapon manufacturing facilities. This may be unknown and hard to determine, or it may be located on territory subject to the jurisdiction of a government that is for some reason not prepared to take decisive action against the group involved.

Once a terrorist group possesses fission explosives or radiological weapons, the group's options for their coercive use, both aggressively and to deter enforcement action against it, cover the complete range of options discussed previously for an individual acting alone and for profit-oriented criminal groups. However, if a terrorist group were involved, doubts concerning the credibility of many options previously considered would be substantially removed, and the inner logic of the possibilities for nuclear coercion would control. These possibilities would be exploited by a group of people who might be quite free of the practical, intellectual, or emotional restraints that tend to inhibit the use of violence by other groups.

DIVERSION BY A NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Options

We consider here only the risk that the managers of a nuclear enterprise might divert to an illicit use some of the material flowing through facilities under their operational control. The most likely diversion option would be for the managers of processing facilities to manipulate material balances within the margins of uncertainty in the accountancy system. The nuclear material input of a fuel reprocessing or fabrication plant is not known to anyone exactly. Therefore, the input could be stated to be at the lower limit of the range of uncertainty, or in other words at the lower limit of the limit of error of material unaccounted for (LEMUF). The output could then be stated to be either at the lower or at the upper limit of the LEMUF. If the material output were stated to be at the lower limit, the excess material, if any, could be diverted and secretly kept or disposed of. If, however, the output were stated at the upper limit, the plant management might be able to charge its customers for more material than was actually present.

Reasons

The managers of a nuclear enterprise may want to divert material in order to cover up previous material losses known to the management but not yet discovered by the AEC authorities. The managers may want to have some clandestine material on hand simply as a convenient way to remove material