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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards
vulnerability to swift and forceful government action during the
period between nuclear theft and completion of the fabrication of
fission explosive devices or radiological weapons.
The ability
of a government, whether U.S. or foreign, to deal with an emergent
terrorist nuclear threat would depend on the location of the
group's base of operations, particularly the location of its weapon
manufacturing facilities. This may be unknown and hard to
determine, or it may be located on territory subject to the
jurisdiction of a government that is for some reason not prepared
to take decisive action against the group involved.
Once a
terrorist group possesses fission explosives or radiological
weapons, the group's options for their coercive use, both
aggressively and to deter enforcement action against it, cover the
complete range of options discussed previously for an individual
acting alone and for profit-oriented criminal groups. However, if a
terrorist group were involved, doubts concerning the credibility of
many options previously considered would be substantially removed,
and the inner logic of the possibilities for nuclear coercion would
control. These possibilities would be exploited by a group of
people who might be quite free of the practical, intellectual, or
emotional restraints that tend to inhibit the use of violence by
other groups.
DIVERSION BY A NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE
Options
We consider
here only the risk that the managers of a nuclear enterprise might
divert to an illicit use some of the material flowing through
facilities under their operational control. The most likely
diversion option would be for the managers of processing facilities
to manipulate material balances within the margins of uncertainty
in the accountancy system. The nuclear material input of a fuel
reprocessing or fabrication plant is not known to anyone exactly.
Therefore, the input could be stated to be at the lower limit of
the range of uncertainty, or in other words at the lower limit of
the limit of error of material unaccounted for (LEMUF). The output
could then be stated to be either at the lower or at the upper
limit of the LEMUF. If the material output were stated to be at the
lower limit, the excess material, if any, could be diverted and
secretly kept or disposed of. If, however, the output were stated
at the upper limit, the plant management might be able to charge
its customers for more material than was actually
present.
Reasons
The managers
of a nuclear enterprise may want to divert material in order to
cover up previous material losses known to the management but not
yet discovered by the AEC authorities. The managers may want to
have some clandestine material on hand simply as a convenient way
to remove material