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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards
accountancy anomalies as they arise—an easy way to balance
the books. Furthermore, the managers of a nuclear facility may view
manipulation of material balances as a way to increase slightly the
profitability of the enterprise. (The possibility of collusion
between the managers of civilian nuclear operations and government
authorities in the clandestine diversion of nuclear material for
use in a broad range of government military programs, which is a
concern primarily with respect to non-nuclear-weapon countries, is
considered in Appendix D.)
Scope of
the Risk
The risk that
nuclear enterprise managers might manipulate material balances to
their own advantage seems to be inherent in the nuclear power
industry because of the high intrinsic value of the materials
involved and the fact that no one will know exactly how much is
actually flowing through a major facility. In addition to the
presumed honesty of nuclear plant managers, however, there are
limitations on the scope of this particular diversion risk. If an
"arms length" commercial relationship exists between the operators
of distinct steps in the fuel cycle, the possibilities for
diversion by materials balance manipulations would be lessened. In
addition, since one person could probably not get very far in a
complicated manipulation process, a conspiracy within the plant
would be necessary. This would substantially increase both the
difficulty of diversion and the risk of detection.
Government
materials accountancy requirements could arguably have the effect
of either increasing or reducing incentives within industry to
manipulate nuclear materials balances. Vigorous government
enforcement of stringent materials accountancy requirements might
increase the incentives for plant managers to cheat the system in
order to be sure they could balance the books and keep their
facilities operating efficiently. However, a lax governmental
attitude towards materials accountancy might reduce incentives for
discipline within industrial operations, open up opportunities for
much larger manipulations of materials balances, and perhaps create
conditions in which large scale diversions by criminal or terrorist
groups could occur without timely detection.
DIVERSION BY A POLITICAL FACTION WITHIN
A NATION
Scope of
the Risk
The
government of a nation is normally not of one mind. The possession
by a faction or interest group within the government of enough
nuclear material in a suitable form to make a few weapons might
significantly affect the internal balance of political forces
within a nation. This particular risk of nuclear diversion would
seem negligible in the U.S. However, it could be