NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET

The existence or lack of a market for stolen nuclear material, and the characteristics of such a market, would substantially affect the diversion risks previously considered. In general, the profit incentives for nuclear diversion would be increased greatly if stolen nuclear material were easy to dispose of in transactions on a black market. Although the obstacles in the way of black market development appear quite large, the potential for profits by the middlemen in the market could also be very great.

Sellers in a nuclear black market might be any of the potential thieves previously discussed. A ready market could increase not only the incentives for thefts, but also the probability that stolen material could be successfully ransomed as an alternative to marketing it. The existence of a well-developed black market would perhaps be especially pernicious, because it would ease the problems an individual acting alone would otherwise face in disposing of any nuclear material he might steal.

Terrorist groups and national governments are the more likely customers in a black market. There would also seem to be possibilities for the operators of a nuclear black market to stimulate demand. Terrorist groups often appear to emulate each other's tactics. Moreover, an initial sale or two of nuclear weapons to petty dictators with dreams of glory might thereafter enable the operators in a nuclear black market to play on the fears of more responsible leaders, who would then have no way of knowing which nations had secret nuclear weapon stockpiles. A nuclear black market could offer the governments of nations without any previous civilian or military nuclear capabilities opportunities for acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a development could, therefore, greatly increase the dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation throughout the world.

A black market in nuclear material would seem to require a subtle and complex structure, possibly composed of several loosely affiliated groups. The market would probably become transnational in scope since demands for stolen nuclear material or fabricated weapons would not necessarily come from a country that has the sources of supply. Weapon fabrication or material processing services may or may not be part of the market operations. If they were, these activities might take place in remote areas or where a government was willing to look the other way.