Thus far in this study we have examined the magnitude of the U.S. nuclear power industry and the potential risks of nuclear theft. We have also discussed the present AEC regulatory requirements designed to protect and account for nuclear materials, and observed that a safeguards system is not yet fully developed. Clearly, much remains to be done—and urgently—if an effective system of safeguards against nuclear theft is to be fully operational before very large amounts of fission explosive materials begin to flow through the U.S. nuclear power industry.

In this chapter we explore a number of basic issues related to the development of a nuclear safeguards system, including how effective such a system should be, and we also suggest a framework for the development of a variety of safeguard options. In chapters 8 and 9 we analyze specific safeguard measures and consider the costs of a safeguards system.

THE CONTEXT

We are concerned in this study with safeguards to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from civilian industry to an illicit use. This particular objective should be viewed as part of regulating and controlling the civilian nuclear power industry in order to achieve several important purposes that are in the public interest. Aside from safeguards to prevent or detect theft, the control of nuclear material is necessary for two major reasons: to ensure that valuable materials are used efficiently as fuel for the generation of electric power or heat; and to ensure that radioactive materials that could endanger human health are used safely and are not inadvertently released to the environment in dangerous quantities or willfully dispersed by acts of sabotage. Controls designed to avert inefficient or unsafe use of nuclear material may either complement or conflict with safeguards to ensure against theft.