PURPOSES
OF A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM
Perhaps the
most difficult task of all in developing and implementing a nuclear
safeguards system is the formulation of meaningful objectives. It
was relatively easy to develop an objective for the U.S. space
program in the 1960s. President Kennedy did this in 1961 when he
said: "We shall place man on the moon and bring him back to earth
before the end of this decade." It is also possible to develop
"full employment" as a continuing national goal and then to define
a 4 or 5 percent level of unemployment as unsatisfactory
performance. Though it is much more difficult for the United States
to maintain full employment than to place a man on the moon, both
objectives are meaningful to government, to industry, and to the
man in the street.
When it comes
to nuclear safeguards, what should be the objective of U.S. policy?
We may initially and tentatively state the purpose of a nuclear
safeguards systems as follows: to provide effective assurance
against acts of nuclear violence using material unlawfully obtained
from the nuclear power industry. When words are strung together
in this way, the result is an opaque and abstract statement of the
problem. However, it should be noted that many statements of
purpose in legislation and administrative regulations are even more
vague and less meaningful. For example, the legislative standard in
the Atomic Energy Act for evaluating U.S. nuclear materials
safeguards is that the controls must provide assurance against
activities "inimical to the common defense and security or to the
health and safety of the public." Nevertheless, our tentative
formulation of purpose set forth above is useful as a point of
departure.
We have
avoided use of the word "goal" in our statement regarding
safeguards because this word seems to imply the existence of some
milestone which, if reached, signals the completion of a task. The
risks of nuclear theft will persist in the foreseeable future,
though it will be possible to reduce their likelihood and impact
considerably. Consequently, the development and maintenance of
effective safeguards will require continuing effort. Specific goals
and objectives will probably have to be revised often in the light
of advances in nuclear technology, growth of the nuclear industry,
changes in the level and character of acts of violence (not
necessarily nuclear), national and international