when the man in the street remains unaware of the nature and scope of the risk to which he will be exposed. Nor can general public consent be inferred from broad legislative delegations of relevant authority to the AEC and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, when public hearings on this specific nuclear risk have never been held, and when most members of Congress remain as uninformed in this respect as the people that elected them.

Finally, the problem of nuclear theft exists wherever nuclear power industries exist. A successful nuclear theft in one country may result in widespread destruction in another, far distant country a few weeks or several years later. Attitudes toward levels of risk and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards can be expected to cover at least as wide a range between countries as between groups within one country, such as the United States.

Given the difficulties discussed above, it seems that all attempts to develop a meaningful statement of overall goals for a nuclear safeguards system may well end in frustration. However, our discussion thus far does lead us to conclude as follows: In view of the seriousness of the risks arising out of a successful nuclear theft, the safeguards system applicable to the nuclear power industry should employ the best available technology and institutional mechanisms. The safeguards system should be developed and implemented with a view to keeping the risks of nuclear theft as low as practicable. We believe these statements can serve as a useful guide to the development and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system that will function effectively in a dynamic world in which technological, economic, social, and political factors are changing rapidly.