to high-enriched uranium or plutonium. This matter will be encountered again in connection with accountancy measures required to detect thefts.

The design of jobs in nuclear industry is thus important. It appears desirable from a safeguards standpoint to clearly separate jobs requiring access to nuclear weapon materials from all other jobs in the industry. In order to increase the motivation and productivity of workers, steps are being taken in other industries to redesign jobs so that the monotony of repeating one simple task is avoided and a variety of tasks are integrated. Would designing jobs in nuclear industry so as to minimize the number of employees requiring access to nuclear weapon materials adversely affect the productivity of workers in nuclear industry? Or the quality of workers attracted to the industry? These may become important questions in developing a safeguards system.

Who may be employed in jobs requiring access to nuclear weapon materials? Two approaches are possible. First, in addition to normal procedures used to hire employees at the facility concerned, special procedures may be used to screen any employee to be authorized access to these materials. Such procedures would be intended to ensure that the employee is trustworthy from a security point of view. Second, special surveillance measures may be used to observe all employees, either as a supplement to or instead of stringent personnel security requirements.

Employee Security Clearance. Requiring special clearance of employees to be authorized access to nuclear weapon materials may raise a number of problems related to compliance with equal employment opportunity laws and regulations, the rules and employment practices in collective bargaining agreements between unions and the managements of various nuclear enterprises, and state right-to-work laws. Positions requiring access to nuclear weapon materials may, depending on a variety of factors, be viewed as highly desirable. Therefore, any conditions attached, such as a security clearance, may be a potential source of conflict between unions and management in the determination of who gets the plums.

In addition to reducing the flexibility of management in making work assignments, a security clearance requirement would restrict job mobility of workers in the nuclear industry. If a security clearance were required, jobs could be denied to various employees on grounds that had nothing to do with merit or technical qualifications. Moreover, the denial of clearance to an employee may prejudice his subsequent career anywhere in the nuclear power industry, even in less sensitive positions.

If some form of security clearance were required as a prerequisite to a job involving access to nuclear weapon material, substantial issues would arise concerning the nature of the clearance procedure and the qualifications of those responsible for conducting it. Many companies use psychological and aptitude tests as an aid in determining the suitability of applicants for various jobs. Such