Functions of Detection
At the outset
of a discussion of the means of detecting nuclear theft, it is
necessary to differentiate and clarify various functions that
detection may serve within an overall system of safeguards. Without
positive assurance that unlawful diversion would be detected, it
would be impossible to have confidence that a safeguards system was
working effectively. Hence, an important function of detection is
to verify the effectiveness of protective measures. Detection may
also, as discussed above, actually prevent theft if the means of
detection scares the thieves away or if detection leads to
apprehension of the criminals before the theft is complete. Any
detection may trigger efforts to recover material that has been
previously stolen.
Finally, the
detection capability may itself constitute a deterrent to theft.
The extent to which this indirect or secondary deterrent effect is
achieved depends largely on whether the detection capability is
perceived by potential thieves as being related directly to either
prevention or recovery, or both. A detection capability not clearly
and convincingly related to either prevention or recovery
capabilities would have little effect as a deterrent. (This
conclusion applies mainly to domestic criminal diversion from
nuclear power industries. At the international level, the
likelihood of detection of governmentally authorized diversion and
the ensuing exposure of its intention may help to deter governments
from acquiring nuclear weapons.)
It should be
noted that, apart from safeguards considerations, accurate
knowledge about material flows in nuclear industry is important for
two other reasons. Indeed, these reasons may be more important than
the assurance against nuclear theft which various means of
detection provide.
In the first
place, nuclear materials—and especially high-enriched
uranium, plutonium, and uranium–233—are extremely
valuable fuels. The accuracy of measurement and accounting methods,
therefore, will have very large financial implications for nuclear
industry. Both the owner and the processors of material being
fabricated into nuclear fuel or reprocessed following irradiation
will want accurate measurement and accounting procedures.
Moreover,