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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards
collusion with certain employees. It would also reduce the risk
that management would attempt to cover up inexplicable losses in
excess of LEMUF's or actual thefts which had been discovered. Thus,
ensuring honest and careful management may be the most important
function of accountancy as far as governmental regulation at the
national level is concerned.
Finally,
material accountancy is the safeguards measure that is accorded
"fundamental importance" in the IAEA system under the NPT. In light
of the broad U.S. government offer to permit IAEA inspection of
civilian nuclear facilities in the United States, U.S. accountancy
requirements must be compatible with those of the IAEA. Moreover,
the accountancy requirements imposed by the AEC on the U.S. nuclear
industry are likely to furnish a ceiling beyond which the IAEA will
not be able to go in developing parallel measures to be
administered by the Agency with respect to nuclear power industries
in non-nuclear-weapon countries which are parties to the NPT.
RECOVERY
OF STOLEN NUCLEAR MATERIALS
While AEC
officials have recognized the importance of procedures for the
prompt recovery of stolen nuclear materials and indicated that such
procedures have been developed, the AEC has revealed nothing of
substance to the public. It is unlikely that official thinking
about the basic issues involved will be revealed, and details will
most certainly remain secret. What follows is, therefore, not a
discussion of various means of recovery, but an effort to stimulate
thought about basic issues that should properly be of concern to
the public as a whole.
Are
Special Recovery Plans and Capabilities Necessary as Part of an
Effective Safeguards System?
In other
words, in view of what can and should be done to prevent unlawful
diversion, will the residual risk of a successfully completed
nuclear theft be so high that special plans and capabilities to
recover stolen materials are still necessary? A negative answer to
this question does not necessarily mean that nothing would be done
in the event of a successful theft, but rather that general
procedures and existing law enforcement capabilities would be
relied on. However, there are at least three reasons justifying
special attention to the recovery problem, even assuming stringent
prevention measures are taken.
First, no
matter what safeguards measures were instituted to prevent nuclear
theft, the residual risk of successful theft would not be reduced
to zero. Given this situation, a special recovery effort is
justified for whatever further reduction in the intrinsic security
risk it may bring. Moreover, the known absence of any special plans
might invite theft attempts.
Second,
nuclear materials (especially uranium–233 and plutonium and,
to a lesser extent, uranium–235) have special characteristics
that make