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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards







collusion with certain employees. It would also reduce the risk that management would attempt to cover up inexplicable losses in excess of LEMUF's or actual thefts which had been discovered. Thus, ensuring honest and careful management may be the most important function of accountancy as far as governmental regulation at the national level is concerned.

Finally, material accountancy is the safeguards measure that is accorded "fundamental importance" in the IAEA system under the NPT. In light of the broad U.S. government offer to permit IAEA inspection of civilian nuclear facilities in the United States, U.S. accountancy requirements must be compatible with those of the IAEA. Moreover, the accountancy requirements imposed by the AEC on the U.S. nuclear industry are likely to furnish a ceiling beyond which the IAEA will not be able to go in developing parallel measures to be administered by the Agency with respect to nuclear power industries in non-nuclear-weapon countries which are parties to the NPT.

RECOVERY OF STOLEN NUCLEAR MATERIALS

While AEC officials have recognized the importance of procedures for the prompt recovery of stolen nuclear materials and indicated that such procedures have been developed, the AEC has revealed nothing of substance to the public. It is unlikely that official thinking about the basic issues involved will be revealed, and details will most certainly remain secret. What follows is, therefore, not a discussion of various means of recovery, but an effort to stimulate thought about basic issues that should properly be of concern to the public as a whole.

Are Special Recovery Plans and Capabilities Necessary as Part of an Effective Safeguards System?

In other words, in view of what can and should be done to prevent unlawful diversion, will the residual risk of a successfully completed nuclear theft be so high that special plans and capabilities to recover stolen materials are still necessary? A negative answer to this question does not necessarily mean that nothing would be done in the event of a successful theft, but rather that general procedures and existing law enforcement capabilities would be relied on. However, there are at least three reasons justifying special attention to the recovery problem, even assuming stringent prevention measures are taken.

First, no matter what safeguards measures were instituted to prevent nuclear theft, the residual risk of successful theft would not be reduced to zero. Given this situation, a special recovery effort is justified for whatever further reduction in the intrinsic security risk it may bring. Moreover, the known absence of any special plans might invite theft attempts.

Second, nuclear materials (especially uranium–233 and plutonium and, to a lesser extent, uranium–235) have special characteristics that make