established would probably be controlled by the perpetrators of
the threat, and any overt connection made by the perpetrators may
well be false. In these circumstances, no action against the
nuclear power industry would seem warranted, although safeguard
measures might be tightened, especially those aimed at the response
area itself.
THE
PRINCIPLE OF CONTAINMENT
Having
examined a variety of safeguard measures, we turn now to the task
of pulling them together into a coherent system. Here we limit our
discussion to the prevention of nuclear theft, which we believe is
the primary and most important function of a safeguards system.
As a guide
for designing a nuclear safeguards system we suggest what we call
the "principle of containment." According to this principle, all
materials that could be used to make fission explosives and that
are used, produced, or processed in the nuclear power industry
would be contained in areas circumscribed by a well defined set of
barriers. These barriers would exclude unauthorized persons. A
minimum number of authorized channels for the flow of such
materials through the barriers would be established. All other
channels would be continuously monitored, by means of the best
available technology, to detect any unauthorized flow of materials.
In addition to the physical barriers, a network of alarms,
communications, and security forces would be set up in such a way
that no credible attempt to remove nuclear materials from
authorized channels, whether by employees, outsiders, or a
combination, would be successful.
The
containment principle suggests emphasis on immediate detection of
unauthorized material flows, rather than measurement after
the fact of authorized material flows and inventories. In other
words, more attention would be given to material that is detected
where it is not supposed to be than to material that
is where it should be. Such a detection system would not,
however, prevent an attempted theft by employees or outsiders
unless it is supported by effective means to stop or slow down any
unauthorized flow that is detected long enough to allow security
forces to arrive in sufficient strength to prevent completion of
the theft. Furthermore, methods should be employed to detect
immediately any attempt at unauthorized entry into an area where
the containment principle is applicable.
The risks of
nuclear theft appear to us to warrant the development of a
safeguards system for the U.S. nuclear power industry (and also
nuclear power industries in other countries) that would prevent a
significant armed attack from being successful. Accordingly, the
maximum credible threat which the nuclear safeguards system would
be designed to defeat would be an attack by a group of perhaps a
dozen persons employing sophisticated firearms and
equipment.