available in the public record. This need for secrecy makes it
doubly important, however, for the AEC to develop specific
safeguards standards that can be justified in public hearings, and
to develop an approval and inspection process to ensure that
established standards are fully implemented.
A System
of Safeguards Can Be Developed That Will Keep the Risks of Theft of
Nuclear Weapon Materials from the Nuclear Power Industry at Very
Low Levels.
Safeguards
should emphasize the prevention of theft of any nuclear
weapon materials from the nuclear power industry, and the
detection of any theft attempt in time to prevent its
completion. Detection of a completed theft, recovery of stolen
nuclear weapon material, and response to any nuclear threat
involving stolen material are important supplementary safeguard
functions.
The principle
of containment should be used as the basis for the design and
development of safeguard measures. The physical barriers and
security forces employed to contain nuclear weapon materials in
order to prevent theft should be capable of defeating the maximum
credible threat that can be reasonably expected anywhere in any
nuclear fuel cycle. That threat might involve an attack by a group
of perhaps five to ten persons using sophisticated firearms and
equipment.
Insofar as
practical, instruments and techniques should be developed and used
to provide a timely and accurate picture of the material flows in
authorized channels in the various nuclear fuel cycles.
Furthermore, instruments and techniques should be developed and
used to detect immediately the flow of any nuclear weapon
materials out of a material access area through an unauthorized
channel.
The best
available technology and institutional mechanisms should be
used in the safeguards system. The technology involved in the
nuclear power industry is changing rapidly as a result of intensive
research and development efforts. This offers both a challenge and
an opportunity with respect to safeguards technology. The challenge
is for safeguards technology to keep up with relevant changes in
fuel cycle technology, while the opportunity is to take safeguards
considerations fully into account initially in developing nuclear
power options.
The
technological problems related to the development of an effective
system of safeguards against nuclear theft can be solved in fairly
straightforward ways. Some of the institutional problems, however,
appear very difficult and the solutions to many of them are
elusive.