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Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards







People who absorb lethal but not massive doses of plutonium would not sense any of its effects for weeks, or perhaps years. The presence of finely divided plutonium in an area could be detected only with sensitive radiation monitoring equipment. Such equipment is now only used to monitor the presence of plutonium or other dangerously radioactive materials in nuclear installations. Except in such installations, therefore, people would not know they were exposed until they were told, either by those responsible for the threat, or by someone in authority who happened to detect the plutonium with instruments.

We are not aware of any successful non-military attempts to use chemical, bacteriological, or radiological poisons to contaminate large areas. Whether any such means will be used in the future for criminal or terrorist purposes is, we believe, an even more speculative question than whether nuclear explosives will be so used. Many types of potentially lethal poisons are no more difficult to acquire than chemical high explosives. However, high explosives are being used with greater frequency and in increasing amounts by terrorists and extortionists, while we have found no evidence that they have ever used poisonous agents. The practically instantaneous, quite obvious destruction that is produced by an explosion apparently better suits the purposes of terrorists and extortionists than poisons that act more slowly and subtly, but that are at least as deadly. Unlike other poisons, however, plutonium can be used either as a poison or as explosive material. Accordingly, a threat using a plutonium dispersal device could conceivably be followed by a threat involving plutonium used in a nuclear explosive.

Other Types of Radiological Weapons

As part of our research for this study, we considered, in some detail, the effects that might be produced by dispersing radioactive materials other than plutonium, or by purposely pulsing various types of unshielded nuclear reactors to destruction without achieving a real nuclear explosion. We conclude that neither type of weapon would be as effective as a plutonium dispersal device or a low-yield fission bomb.

Spent nuclear reactor fuel and the fission products separated from reactor fuels at a chemical reprocessing plant are, potentially, extremely hazardous if dispersed in a populated area. But they would also be very dangerous to handle in sufficient quantities to pose a threat to a large area because they emit highly penetrating gamma rays, thus requiring heavy shielding to protect thieves or weapon makers. In short, plutonium would be easier to use for destructive purposes than radioactive fission products.

If a nuclear reactor core were pulsed to destruction, it would release a comparatively small amount of energy equivalent to, at most, a few hundred pounds of high explosive from a device weighing several tons. It would also release amounts of radiation and radioactive materials that would be very small compared to a low-yield nuclear explosion unless the reactor had been operated