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New Approaches to Conflict Resolution
III
Promising Alternatives
Promising
alternative institutions, procedures, and ideas for the resolutions
of disputes are beginning to appear in the United States and
Europe. While it is difficult to adapt procedures from one society
to another or to broaden their scale from small to large
localities, many of the alternatives may well be transferable. One
purpose of this review is therefore to see how the essential
features of each mechanism can be identified and, with
modifications, used in other situations.
STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF EXISTING
COURTS AND AGENCIES
Economic
Incentives
Economic
incentives, for matters that stand a reasonable chance of being
settled, can cut costs to the parties, reduce delay, particularly
where there is a heavy calendar, and leave the courts freer for
matters which cannot be amicably settled. However, there is a
danger that economic incentives can become coercive. To be fair,
both the incentives and the risks should be equally distributed
among the parties. Devising such a system is difficult, and there
is a special problem when the dispute is between an individual and
a large institution. For example, an insurance company is in a
position to distribute its burden of risk and error over its total
operation and to look at a particular case in the context of its
overall financial picture, while the individual enjoys no such
advantage.